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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Shareholders are stupid and impertinent: stupid, because they 
buy shares, and impertinent, because they demand a return.”1 This 
is how Carl Fuerstenberg, a high profile German banker of the 
between-wars period once referred to minority shareholders. 
Today, the argument that minority shareholders are mere 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
*        Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo, 
Brazil; bruno.salama@fgv.br. 
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        Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo, 
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1.  Theodor Baums & Kenneth Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection 
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 31 (2005) (quoting Carl Fuerstenberg). 
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opportunists lacks foundation.
2
 It is now well established that the 
existence of vibrant stock markets with ample participation by 
minority shareholders is an important vehicle for savings 
mobilization, financial development and economic growth.
3
 In 
recent years a number of studies have shown that enhanced 
minority shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation 
of corporate assets and with more developed and valuable capital 
markets.
4
 Because of this, in the past decade a consensus emerged 
in academic circles suggesting that minority shareholders deserve 
legal protection not only for equitable reasons, but for efficiency 
considerations as well. 
This article examines key elements in the history, structure, 
and application of the legal framework offering protection to 
minority shareholders in Brazilian listed corporations. Such an 
examination is particularly timely. The Economist recently 
predicted that in the next 10-15 years, Brazil shall become the 
world‟s fifth-largest economy, surpassing both France and Britain.5 
As an increasing number of Brazilian corporations become 
publicly traded, and stock ownership becomes dispersed, 
international companies seeking to acquire Brazilian assets will 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2.  In older texts, it is common to find minority shareholders portrayed 
on a negative light. See, e.g. Walter Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, 128 REVISTA 
DE DIREITO MERCANTIL202 (2002) (translated into Portuguese). 
3.  See e.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, 
Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107 (1998) (showing that in countries 
with active stock markets firms were able to obtain larger funding); Ross Levine 
& Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 537 (1998) (relating financial development to economic growth); Maurice 
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
1310 (1994) (showing that growth is encouraged by the ability of investors to 
diversify investments through markets); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 
Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (showing 
that in countries with better protection of external investors the industries 
dependent on external finance are more developed); see also Hal S. Scott, 
International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, (A. Guzman & A. 
Sykes eds. 2007). 
4.  Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World. 54 J. 
OF FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins, 
Consequences and Reform, NBER WORKING PAPER, n. W4728 (1999); Edward 
Glaeser et al., Coase versus the Coasians, 116:3 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 853-
899 (2001); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and 
Equity Markets, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1906 
(2000); Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information and the Poverty of Nations, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2005). 
5.  Brazil Takes-Off, THE ECONOMIST MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2009, at 15. 
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have to deal with Brazilian regulations governing tender offers, 
minority shareholder rights, and fairness opinions and valuations. 
This paper proceeds in Section II by examining the history of 
minority shareholders protection in Brazil. This will give some 
context to the main reformations to the Brazilian Corporations Law 
of 1976.
6
 It will also highlight recent developments in the Brazilian 
stock markets, particularly the fact that dispersed ownership can 
for the first time in Brazilian history be found in a few listed 
corporations. Section III presents the main features of the current 
legal framework for the protection of minority shareholders. It 
analyzes the most important provisions under the Brazilian 
Corporations Law, as well as the most relevant regulations issued 
by the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa). Section IV 
presents the results of an empirical study of the degree of 
enforcement of laws and regulations protecting minority 
shareholders. The data shows that judicial and administrative 
application of such legal provisions is still relatively unpredictable 
and time consuming. Section V concludes. 
 
II. THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The Corporations Law in Brazil governs joint stock companies 
and contains the most important legal provisions dealing with the 
protection of minority shareholders in Brazil. Its intellectual 
foundations can be traced to the Second Plan of National 
Development (“PND II”), a set of guidelines for national industrial 
policies that were put in place during the 1970s.
7
 At that time, the 
formation of large national economic groups was viewed as a 
central component of development strategies across the developing 
world. Inspired by a similar law in South Korea, the Corporations 
Law was conceived as a vehicle that would foster the creation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6.  Federal Law No. 6,404 of 1976. 
7.  See IV SECOND PLAN OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER 
(ECONOMIC STRATEGIES: BASIC OPTIONS. STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL 
COMPANY AND FOREIGN CAPITAL); see also 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ 
LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO E 
MODIFICAÇÕES (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 1997); EGBERTO LACERDA 
TEIXEIRA & JOSÉ ALEXANDRE TAVARES GUERREIRO, DAS SOCIEDADES 
ANÔNIMAS NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 3-12 (São Paulo 1979); Orlando Gomes, 
Fontes e Significado das Inovações da L. n. 6.404, 275 REVISTA FORENSE 
(1981).  
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national “champions”—that is, large conglomerates controlled by 
Brazilian groups.
8
 
The Corporations Law of 1976 reflected the political dynamics 
of the time. The then-incumbent military regime was striving to 
develop the economy while keeping political power concentrated.
9
 
Similarly, the Corporations Law intended to spread capital 
ownership of listed corporations without democratizing the 
political power within them. According to most Brazilian legal 
scholars, the Corporation Law‟s central objective was the 
preservation of the interests of large business groups.
10
 At the same 
time, and sometimes in tension with the goal of protecting 
controlling shareholders, the Corporations Law sought to extend 
enough protection to minority shareholders, so as to entice 
investors to voluntarily turn to the stock market.
11
 
In order to maintain the power structure within the Brazilian 
corporations that decided to go public, the Corporations Law of 
1976 allowed corporations to issue preferred shares. Originally, up 
to 2/3 of the total capital stock could be comprised of preferred, 
nonvoting stock.
12
 At the same time, the Corporations Law 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8.  See DAVID TRUBEK ET AL., O MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E OS 
INCENTIVOS FISCAIS (Rio de Janeiro, TN-APEC 1971); see also MÁRIO 
HENRIQUE SIMONSEN & ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS, A NOVA ECONOMIA 
BRASILEIRA 206-207 (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1979) 
(discussinghow the enactment of the Corporations Law was part of a broad set 
of complementary measures designed to develop the Brazilian stock markets, 
including the granting of tax benefits for both companies that decided to go 
public and minority investors in the stock market.).  
9.  A military coup set the military forces in power in Brazil in 1964. 
The country remained under a military regime until 1985, when civil 
government was reinstated. A new Federal Constitution was enacted in 1988 and 
has been in full force ever since. 
10.  See e.g. MODESTO CARVALHOSA, A NOVA LEI DAS SOCIEDADES 
ANÔNIMAS. SEU MODELO ECONÔMICO (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1976).  
11.  This dual concern for strengthening of the Brazilian conglomerates 
and protecting minority shareholders can be found in the Motives (“Exposição 
de Motivos”) of the Corporations Law (EM No. 196/76) written by Mário 
Henrique Simonsen, then Minister of Finance:  
4. The project basically aims at creating the legal structure necessary 
for strengthening of the country‟s capital markets, which in the 
current stage of the development of the Brazilian economy is 
indispensable for the survival of private companies. The voluntary 
mobilization of savings toward the productive sector requires the 
establishment of a system that ensures minority shareholders the 
observance of clear and equitable rules that are appealing in terms of 
security and profitability without paralyzing the business community.  
MÁRIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS. 
12.  The permission to issue up to 2/3 of nonvoting stocks means that in 
the simplest ownership structure a company could be controlled with just one 
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required that such preferred nonvoting shares were granted some 
economic advantages over voting shares. It thus became common 
for listed corporations to establish a very narrow economic 
advantage for nonvoting stock only for the purposes of fulfilling 
this legal requirement. Listed corporations usually had bylaws 
establishing that nonvoting shares had a priority over voting shares 
upon liquidation. In practice, however, bankruptcy proceedings 
were such that shareholders (both voting and nonvoting) were left 
with hardly any value upon conclusion of the liquidation. The 
Corporations Law awarded minority shareholders a set of 
individual rights and established fiduciary duties and obligations 
for the corporation‟s administrators and controlling shareholders. 
Furthermore, the government created the Brazilian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM) 
which was, and still is, in charge of regulating and supervising 
securities markets.
13
 
The Brazilian Corporations Law was basically in line with the 
state-led, import substitutions industrialization models of 
development prevailing in the mid-1970s.
14
 This largely explains 
why the law was not substantially amended until those models lost 
their supremacy in the policy debate. In Brazil, the shift between 
economic models gained momentum with the country‟s 
democratization and the economic reforms championed by 
President Fernando Collor (1990-1992), and consolidated by 
presidents Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995-2003). As a result, the Corporations Law was twice 
reformed, first in 1997
15
 and later in 2001.
16
 
The 1997 reform of the Corporations Law aimed at facilitating 
the ongoing Brazilian privatizations program that was occurring at 
that time.
17
 The most relevant, and most polemic, change brought 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sixth of its capital. Moreover, with additional layered structures control could in 
theory be exercised with an insignificant capital stake. 
13.  The CVM was created by Federal Law No. 6,385 of 1976. It is a 
federal agency linked to the Ministry of Finance. 
14.  Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging 
Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT‟L LAW 875 
(1999). 
15.  Federal Law No. 9.457, of 1997. 
16.  Law No. 10.303, of 2001. In addition, the sections of the 
Corporations Law establishing account rules were amended in 2007. See infra 
note 106. 
17.  The National Program of Privatizations (Programa Nacional de 
Desestatização–PND) was created in 1990 under Law No, 8.031. This law was 
later revoked by Law No. 9.491, of 1997, which revamped the program. 
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about was the elimination of tag along rights for minority voting 
shareholders.
18
 As originally enacted in 1976, the Corporations 
Law had provided for a mandatory tender offer for all of the 
outstanding voting stocks in case of a control transfer.
19
 The tender 
offer was required to be made for a price equal to that paid for the 
controlling block. Tag along rights compelled controlling 
shareholders to include the holdings of voting minorities in sale 
negotiations. In practice, controlling shareholders were then forced 
to share the control premium with all of the remaining voting 
shareholders. This framework placed an important check on the 
controlling groups‟ actions to capture private benefits of control. 
Many of the state-controlled companies that were privatized by 
the end of the 1990s had minority voting shareholders. The 
removal of tag along rights meant that new owners could buy the 
controlling block without having to make tender offers for the 
shares of any minority groups. As a result, the government 
managed to capture the entire control premium paid by acquirers. 
The 1997 reform also abolished other minority protection 
mechanisms. Most noticeably, it eliminated shareholder 
withdrawal rights in mergers and spin-offs, and it lowered the price 
at which shareholders could withdraw in the cases where that right 
continued to be effective.
20
 
In Brazil, the immediate impact of the privatization program on 
the development of the local stock market was at best discrete, if 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18.  It has never been a mandatory requirement that the holders of non-
voting shares receive tender offers directly.  
19.  Corporations Law, article 254: 
The transfer of the control of a listed company shall be subject to the 
prior authorization of the Securities Commission. Paragraph 1-The 
Securities Commission shall ensure that the minority shareholders 
receive equitable treatment by means of a simultaneous public offer 
for acquisition of stocks. Paragraph 2.-If the number of stocks being 
offered, including those belonging to the controlling or majority 
shareholders, exceeds the limit set forth under the public offer, an 
apportionment as provided for in the instrument of offer shall be 
made. 
(As of 1997, this provision is no longer in force.) 
20.  Before the 1997 reform, dissenting shareholders had the right 
to withdraw at a price equal to the book value of their stocks. The 
reform allowed the bylaws to establish that the redemption amount 
could be lower than book value if such redemption amount were 
calculated based on the economic value of the company, which 
would be based on forecast profits assessed through a discounted 
cash flow valuation or other criteria as set forth under the bylaws. 
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not negative.
21
 Accordingly, the 1997 reforms are now believed to 
have generally reduced minority investors‟ confidence.22 In fact, 
by the end of the 1990s the Brazilian stock market was facing a 
serious crisis. The number of corporations listed on 
BM&FBovespa had dropped from 550 in 1996 to 440 in 2001. The 
trade volume dropped from US$ 191 billion in 1997 to US$ 101 
billion in 2000 and US$ 65 billion in 2001. 
This plunge in the Brazilian stock market was hastened by 
several additional factors. First, Brazil and a number of other 
countries (Mexico in 1995, South Korea and Thailand in 1997, 
Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2000-2001 and 
Argentina in 2001-2002) faced a serious liquidity crisis.
23
 In all of 
these countries, a combination of large short-term liabilities and 
relatively scarce internationally liquid assets resulted in extreme 
vulnerability and eventually in a confidence crisis and a reversal of 
capital flow. As international financial conditions worsened, Brazil 
experienced a recession and its currency devalued rapidly. In 1998-
99, the average annual growth rate fell to 0.5%, the Brazilian 
currency lost approximately one-third of its purchasing power from 
April 1998 to April 1999, and fiscal deficits skyrocketed. Second, 
distortionary taxation contributed to further depress the local stock 
markets. In particular, fiscal deficits prompted the government to 
levy a tax on every financial transaction, including on every 
purchase and sale of stocks.
24
 Finally, Brazilian corporations were 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
21.  Érica Rocha Gorga, Direito Societário Brasileiro e Desenvolvimento 
do Mercado de Capitais: Uma Perspectiva de “Direito e Economia”, 93, 
Doctoral Thesis, Law School, University of São Paulo, 2005. (“the Brazilian 
privatization program, [contrary] to similar programs in other parts of the world, 
did not result in the consistent development of the national capital markets“). 
22.  In early 1999, the CVM issued Ordinance No. 299 partially in an 
attempt to remedy the deleterious effects of the 1997 reform on the Brazilian 
stock market. In 2002, Ordinance No. 299 was partially revoked by Ordinance 
No. 358, which in turn was amended by Ordinances No. 369 in 2006, and 449 in 
2007. The requirement to disclose the price of sales of 5% blocks of voting 
stock was maintained (in fact, enhanced) throughout all of this process. 
23.  Nelson H. Barbosa Filho, International Liquidity and Growth in 
Brazil, Center for Economic Policy Analysis Working Paper, 2001, 
http://newschool.edu/cepa/publications/workingpapers/archive/cepa200104.pdf 
(last visited April 21, 2011).  
24.  The tax on financial transactions (named CPMF) was levied on 
every debit (withdrawals and transfers of cash) made in bank account. It was 
originally charged at 0.2% but with time that rate went up to 0.38%. It was 
created in 1997 as a temporary tax and remained in force and effect until 2007. 
An exemption for investments in the stock markets was in place from 2004 to 
2007. 
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given the option to negotiate their stock in the American market 
using American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), thus reducing even 
further the liquidity of the Brazilian stock market.
25
 
In reaction to this series of events, the Brazilian Congress 
started to debate a new round of reforms to the Brazilian 
Corporations Law. At first, Congress seemed to aim at eliminating 
nonvoting stock altogether and at reinstating full-fledged tag along 
rights. Political pressure from controlling groups however led the 
reformation to accomplish much less.
26
 Instead of eliminating 
nonvoting stocks, as originally intended, the reform finally enacted 
in 2001 only reduced the limit for nonvoting stocks from 2/3 to 
50% of the total capital stock.
27
 Most importantly, existing listed 
corporations were exempted from the new limits. Furthermore, tag 
along rights were reinstated, but only for holders of voting shares 
and were limited to 80% of the price paid for the controlling 
stock.
28
 
To compensate for not eliminating the existence of preferred 
stocks, the 2001 reforms tried to give more palpable advantages for 
preferred shareholders. As detailed later on in this paper, this was 
done by giving the corporation the option to choose among 
establishing certain mandatory minimum dividends for preferred 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25.  In July of 2002, The New York Times wrote that the CPMF had 
made BM&FBovespa‟s transaction costs as much as 165% higher than those of 
The New York Stock Exchange. Between 1997 and 2002, about 40% of 
BM&FBovespa investors migrated to American Depository Receipts of blue-
chip Brazilian corporations. See Tony Smith, Stoking a Stock Market 
'Revolution', THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 30, 2002 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/30/business/stoking-a-stock-market-
revolution.html (last visited April 21, 2011).  
26.  See Érica Rocha Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case 
Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 803 (2006) (arguing that in the 2001 
reformation “controllers' interest groups were able to „capture‟ the legislation 
both directly and indirectly. Directly, and most effectively, the interest groups 
exerted pressure on legislators and the President to drop amendments aimed at 
increasing minority shareholders' rights. . . The interest groups were also able to 
indirectly influence the proposed reforms by adding several amendments to the 
text of the law. These amendments reduced the effectiveness of minority 
rights.”). 
27.  Corporations Law, art. 15. 
28.  See id. at art. 254A (“The direct or indirect transfer of control of a 
listed corporation can only be effected under the condition that the purchaser 
agrees to conduct a public offer to acquire the voting stocks owned by the 
remaining shareholders. The offer price for such stocks shall be at least 80% of 
the amount paid for the voting stocks comprising the controlling block”); see 
also id. at art. 17, §7 (The 2001 reform also created the possibility that the 
government could have a golden share [giving special veto powers] in the 
corporations being privatized.). 
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stocks, establishing dividends for preferred stocks higher than 
those applying to voting stocks, or establishing limited tag along 
rights for preferred shareholders upon sale of the controlling 
interest.
29
  
It is fair to say that the 2001 reformation of the Corporations 
Law increased the overall level of protection of minority 
shareholders. Improvements included a requirement for making a 
tender offer to minority shareholders in case of delisting,
30
 the 
enactment of provisions expressly prohibiting and criminalizing 
the practice of insider trading,
31
 and increased representation of 
minority shareholders in the board of directors of listed 
corporations.
32
 At the same time, the preservation of nonvoting 
stocks and the limitations in tag along rights meant that the 
improvements to the position of minority shareholders were less 
significant than what was boasted by numerous politicians of the 
time. 
It was self-regulation—rather than state regulation—that 
created the conditions for truly enhanced corporate governance 
practices and higher protections for minority shareholders in 
Brazil. In December of 2000, just before the enactment of the 2001 
reform of the Corporations Law by Congress, BM&FBovespa 
created three special corporate governance listing segments.
33
 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29. Id. at art. 17. See infra notes 72-74. 
30. Id. at art. 4 (“The public listing of a corporation may only be 
canceled if the corporation that issued the stocks, the majority shareholder or the 
controlling corporation directly or indirectly makes a tender offer to acquire all 
of the outstanding stocks for a fair price, at least equal to the appraised equity 
value of the corporation, calculated based on one or more of the following 
criteria: accounting net worth, equity value calculated at market value, 
discounted cash flow, multiples comparison, market value, or another criterion 
adopted by the Brazilian Securities Commission.” . . . Shareholders holding at 
least 10% of outstanding stocks of a listed corporation may request the officers 
to call a special shareholders‟ meeting with holders of outstanding stocks in 
order to determine a new appraisal, based on the same or different criteria from 
those originally adopted, for purposes of determining the valuation of the 
corporation as provided for [above]”). 
31.  Id. at art. 155; see infra notes 127-130. 
32.  Id. at art. 141. 
33.  The rules enacted by BM&FBovespa governing the new listing 
segments are currently being revised. The main topics being debated involve a 
requirement for the election of independent directors, the extension of 
arbitration to all shareholders, and the definition of “diffuse control.” The 
amended version of current rules is expected to be published still in 2010. Under 
the deliberation procedures presently in place, a proposed amendment must be 
previously presented in a closed hearing to the corporations listed in each 
segment. The proposition can be blocked by a formal rejection of at least 1/3 of 
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these new listing segments, corporations could voluntarily agree to 
adopt governance practices that went far beyond the minimum 
standards established under the Brazilian Corporations Law, 
arguably providing much greater transparency and strengthening 
the rights and protections of minority shareholders.
34
 
The three listing segments were named Novo Mercado 
(literally, “new market”), Level 2 and Level 1. Novo Mercado‟s 
biggest advance was to do away with the nonvoting stock that had 
caused so much political controversy in the past.
35
 Corporations 
listed in the Novo Mercado were also required to grant unrestricted 
tag along rights to all of their shareholders.
36
 In addition, they were 
required to fulfill a number of additional obligations, for example: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the corporations listed in each such segment. Moreover, before coming into 
force, the amended regulations must be approved by the CVM. See Novo 
Mercado Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-
us/markets/download/regulamento.pdf; Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing 
Rules, item 9.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-
us/markets/download/regulamento_ niveisI_ingles.pdf; Corporate Governance 
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-
us/markets/download/regulamento_niveis_ingles.pdf (last visited April 21, 
2011). 
34.  The creation of these special listing segments was partly inspired by 
the Germany‟s Neuer Markt. See Jose Roberto Menconca de Barros et al., 
Desafios e Oportunidades para o Mercado de Capitais Brasileiro, MB 
Associados, June 2000 available at http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/a-
bmfbovespa/download/mercado capitaisdesafios.pdf. Notice that special 
European listing segments, such as Germany‟s Neuer Markt, were generally 
designed to attract companies from fast-growing markets and high tech, 
especially in areas such as internet, telecommunications, media, and 
biotechnology. Conversely, BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments place no 
restriction on fields of activities, nor are they reserved for small companies. See 
Stijn Claessens et al., Corporate Governance Reform Issues in Brazilian Equity 
Markets, available at www.ifc.org/ 
ifcext/corporategovernance.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Brazil-
CG%2BReform%2BIssues%2B(2001).pdf (surveying the studies that led to the 
creation of the Novo Mercado); Maria Helena Santana et al., Global Corporate 
Governance Forum, Novo Mercado and its followers: Case Studies in 
Corporate Governance Reform, FOCUS 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus+5/$FILE/Novo+M
ercado+text+screen+4-21-08.pdf (describing the history of the creation, 
implementation and assessing the concrete results within each listing segment); 
see also Ronald Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: 
Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S. and the EU, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
NETWORK, March 1, 2010 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1541226 (using 
Brazil‟s special listing segments as a case study for a theory of non-state, 
parallel securities regulation) (last visited April 21, 2011). 
35.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 3.1, VI. 
36.  Id. at item 8.1 (providing that in the event of sale of control the 
buyer must make a tender offer to buy all outstanding stocks under equal terms, 
with no 80% ceiling). 
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(1) maintaining a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float,
37
 
(2) establishing a unified maximum two-year term for the entire 
board of directors with at least five directors,
38
 (3) submitting 
yearly financial statements pursuant to US GAAP or IRFS norms, 
improving the disclosure of information in the quarterly financial 
statements,
39
 and (4) making tender offers based on economic 
value to holders of stock in free float both in case of delisting and 
of withdrawal from the Novo Mercado.
40
 Moreover, any disputes 
between corporation and shareholders would be solved by binding 
arbitration.
41
 
The key distinction between the Novo Mercado and Level 2 is 
that the latter allows the corporations to have nonvoting shares, 
while the former does not.
42
 Still, holders of preferred stock of 
corporations listed in Level 2 must be granted the right to vote in 
certain matters such as incorporation, merger, spin-off, the 
approval of contracts entered into between the corporation and 
firms of the same holding group, appraisal of assets contributed to 
pay up capital increases, the choice of the independent expert in 
charge of valuating the corporation, and the amendment to the 
corporation‟s bylaws, including with respect to its rules of 
corporate governance.
43
 Moreover, in case controlling shareholders 
sell their stake, a tender offer must be presented to the preferred 
shareholders in the amount of at least 80% of the value/conditions 
paid to the controlling group (remember that under the 
Corporations Law, preferred shareholders have no tag along 
rights).
44
 As to Level 1, which is the less stringent of the special 
listing segments, the adhering corporations have to fulfill less 
rigorous variations of obligations that apply to the Novo Mercado 
and to Level 2. Although Level 1 also requires corporations to 
maintain a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float, most of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
37.  Id. at item 7.3 and item 2.1 (defining “Minimum Free Float”). 
38.  Id. at items 4.3 and 4.4. 
39.  Id. at items 6.1 e 6.2. 
40.  Id. at item 10.2; and, see also, id. at item 11.7 (providing that the 
corporations‟ securities cannot be traded on the Novo Mercado for at least 2 
years after the delisting is formalized). 
41.  Id. at item 13.1. 
42.  Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 3.1, (i). 
43.  Id. at item 4.1. 
44.  Id. at item 8.1.3. See RICARDO LEAL & ANDRÉ CARVALHAL DA 
SILVA, PRÊMIO IBGC DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA( 2007) (noting that the 
percentage of corporations where nonvoting preferred stocks represents less than 
20% sharply increased from 17.9% in 1998, to 39.6% in 2007). 
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its provisions deal with mechanisms that enhance transparency and 
disclosure requirements.
45
 In any case, corporations listed in any of 
the special listing segments will always have to abide by the 
minimum standards set forth under the Corporations Law. 
After a slow start, BM&FBovespa‟s new listing segments 
eventually took off. In November of 2007, the Financial Times 
wrote: “Not long ago the São Paulo Stock Exchange was a sleepy 
backwater, much like any other stock exchanges in Latin America . 
. . Since then, things have changed. By 2006, average daily trading 
had risen to R$2.4bn ($1.1bn). The [BM&FBovespa]‟s 
extraordinary initial public offering on October 26 shot it into the 
top rank of world capital markets.” BM&FBovespa closed 2007 
with an accumulated rise of 72% (measured in U.S. dollars), the 
third biggest rise among the world‟s stock exchanges.46 It should 
also be noted that the effects of the most recent international 
financial crisis on the Brazilian stock exchange have so far been 
mild. In truth, 2008 witnessed a reduction both in the number of 
corporations listed at the BM&FBovespa, as well as in total market 
capitalization.
47
 However, this trend was soon reversed, as 
BM&FBovespa‟s market capitalization in 2009 ended 82.5% 
higher than that of 2008.
48
  
In the beginning of 2010, almost half of BM&FBovespa‟s 433 
corporations were listed in a special segment: 106 corporations 
were listed in the Novo Mercado, 19 in Level 2, and 35 in Level 
1.
49
 The remaining 273 corporations are still listed at 
BM&FBovespa pursuant to traditional, legally required levels of 
corporate governance, but most of them had previously gone 
public. In fact, voluntarily adherence to one of the special listing 
segments has now become standard practice for the numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
45.  Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, Part IV, item 5.2. 
46. Bovespa fecha o ano como 3ª mais rentável do mundo, com alta de 
72% em dólar, O GLOBO ONLINE, (December 28, 2007) (The annual rise was 
overcome only by Shenzhen (180.84%) and Shanghai (110.15%) stock 
exchanges, both located in China. BOVESPA's main competitor in Latin 
America, Mexico's BMV accumulated a rise of 11.32% in 2007).  
47. BM&FBovespa 2008 Annual Report, available at 
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/Relatorio2008/english/index_ Anual.pdf  (last visited 
April 21, 2011). 
48.  BM&FBovespa, Boletim Empresas, Edition 12, Year 2, available at 
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/empresas/boletim_ empresas.asp  (last visited April 
21, 2011).  
49.  Id. 
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IPOs that took place through BM&FBovespa during the last 
decade.  
While the link between law and economic development 
remains a theoretical quagmire,
50
 academics debate about whether 
improved corporate governance was a cause or a consequence of 
economic improvements in Brazil.
51
 There is no doubt that the 
protective framework for minority shareholders that emerged from 
the crisis of 2001 was the product of institutional fiat. However, it 
cannot be ignored that Brazil‟s robust economic cycle reinforced 
the effectiveness and stability of such a legal design. Be that as it 
may, the fact remains that the protection of minority shareholders 
is now substantially higher than when the Corporations Law was 
originally enacted. 
 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROTECTING  
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
 
The legal framework pertaining to the protection of minority 
shareholders of listed corporations is fragmented and contained in 
essentially two, and in some cases three, statutory bodies. First, the 
Corporations Law itself;
52
 second, the myriad of instructions 
enacted by the supervising authority, the CVM; and third, in the 
special regulations enacted by the BM&FBovespa that apply to 
corporations listed in the special listing segments, as the case may 
be.  
The starting point for an examination of the legal framework 
protecting minority shareholders of listed corporations should be 
the “essential” rights specified in the Corporations Law.53 These 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
50.  See e.g. Michael Trebilcock & Kevin Davis, The Relationship 
Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
895 (2008) (surveying the literature on the topic). 
51.  See Érica Gorga, Changing The Paradigm of Stock Ownership from 
Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and 
Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439, 444 
(2009). See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469 
(2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law 
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76 
(2001). 
52.  In Brazil, securities and corporations are governed by federal 
legislation. 
53.  See WALDÍRIO BULGARELLI, REGIME JURÍDICO DA PROTEÇÃO ÀS 
MINORIAS NAS S/A (DE ACORDO COM A REFORMA DA LEI N.º 6.404/76) (Rio de 
Janeiro, Renovar, 1998) (with an overview of the protection of minorities 
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rights are established by Congress and they cannot be suppressed 
by the corporation‟s bylaws, or by a resolution of a shareholders 
meeting. There are five essential rights: (1) the right to receive 
dividends, (2) the right to participate in the sale of the 
corporation‟s assets upon liquidation, (3) the right to supervise the 
corporation‟s bodies, (4) the right of first refusal that arises upon 
the subscription of shares, founders‟ shares convertible into shares, 
debentures convertible into shares and subscription bonuses, and 
(5) the right to withdraw from the corporation in specific instances 
set forth under the Corporations Law.
54
  
These and other rights gain clearer focus through examination 
of various instances of Brazilian legislation. A more systematic 
description based on state and non-state law can be observed by 
categorizing minority shareholder rights based on their nature. 
Accordingly, they can be divided into political rights, economic 
rights, oversight and information rights and procedural rights, as 
follows. 
 
A. Political Rights 
 
Political rights allow shareholders to participate in the 
corporate bodies that make decisions on behalf of the corporation, 
particularly the shareholders‟ meeting (“assembléia geral”) and the 
board of directors (“conselho de administração”). 
The most important political right set forth under the 
Corporations Law is the right to vote at shareholders‟ meetings. 
The law establishes certain formalities that have to be followed in 
order to safeguard the participation of voting minority shareholders 
in these meetings. These formalities include giving prior public 
notice of the meetings, having a minimum quorum for the holding 
of valid shareholders‟ meetings, and having the minimum 
percentage of votes for the approval of certain topics. Lack of 
observation of such formalities may cause the resolutions to be 
declared void by courts.
55
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shareholders in Brazil); see also José Alexandre Tavares Guerreiro, Direito das 
Minorias na Sociedade Anônima, 63 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 106-111 
(1986); and Tullio Ascarelli, Usos e Abusos das Sociedades Anônimas, 88 
REVISTA FORENSE 5-33 (1941); TULLIO ASCARELLI, PROBLEMAS DAS 
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS E DIREITO COMPARADO (2d ed. 1969).  
54.  Corporations Law, art. 109. 
55.  Id. at arts. 121-137. See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, 
VÍCIOS EM ASSEMBLÉIA-GERAL ORDINÁRIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE 
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Historically, the notice requirements for listed corporations 
before the valid holding of a shareholders‟ meeting was not a 
major concern of regulators, and for understandable reasons. 
Where there is a clear block of controlling shareholders, 
shareholder meetings are themselves oftentimes just a formality. 
Recently, however, the emergence of corporations with dispersed 
ownership led the CVM to start paying closer attention to 
formalities in shareholder meetings. Accordingly, the CVM 
established a detailed list of information to be provided to 
shareholders before a shareholder meeting can validly take place. 
In addition, the CVM finally allowed and regulated the exercise of 
proxy voting in shareholders‟ meetings.56 It is notable that as of 
March of 2010, BM&FBovespa had five corporations in which the 
three largest shareholders jointly held less than 25% of total voting 
capital.
57
 Furthermore, there were over a dozen corporations in 
which the three largest shareholders held between 25% and 49.9% 
of total voting capital.
58
 
Although there are now a few corporations with dispersed 
ownership in Brazil, a cautionary note still applies to the topic of 
political control in listed corporations. The general pattern of 
corporate control within Brazilian listed corporations is one of high 
political concentration.
59
 The block of controlling shareholders 
systematically holds the majority vote in shareholder meetings, 
being able to solely adopt resolutions and to elect the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 154-166 (1989) (discussing the legal requirements 
generally applicable to the adoption of valid resolutions in shareholders‟ 
meetings). 
56.  CVM Ordinance No. 481 of 2009. 
57.  BM&FBovespa; Gafisa, Lojas Renner, Ideiasnet, and Dimed. 
available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresas-
listadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us (last visited April 21, 2011). 
58.  Eternit, Tecnosolo, Bematech, Embraer, Tovs, Cia Hering, BR 
Brokers, Dasa, Odontoprev, ALL Amer Lat, Itaúsa, Mont Aranha, Agra Incorp, 
Tempo Part, Cremer, São Carlos, among others, available at: 
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresas-
listadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us. (last visited April 21, 2011). 
59.  See Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira et al., Evolution and 
Determinants of Firm-Level Corporate Governance Quality in Brazil, June 
2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995764  (last visited April 21, 2011) 
(as of 2004, the three largest shareholders of Brazilian corporations held, on 
average, 79,3% of voting capital). See also Eduardo Secchi Munhoz, Desafios 
do Direito Societário Brasileiro na Disciplina da Companhia Aberta: Avaliação 
dos Sistemas de Controle Diluído e Concentrado, in 1 DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO: 
DESAFIOS ATUAIS 119-155 (Monteiro de Castro & Santos de Aragão eds. 2009) 
(discussing the optimal legal regime for corporations with concentrated control 
in Brazil). 
162 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
administrators. Therefore, minority shareholders seldom take an 
active role in corporate matters. This is true notwithstanding the 
existence of voting rights that are strictly protected as a matter of 
law. In practice, minority shareholders tend to exercise their voting 
rights more often while supervising the actions of controlling 
shareholders. This commonly arises when certain matters must be 
made public and approved by the shareholder regardless of 
whether there is a controlling block at the meeting or not. These 
matters include the distribution of dividends, the approval of 
financial statements, and the election of administrators. Publicity 
of such information opens the possibility of questioning by 
minority shareholders in court or through the CVM. 
The right to vote can be restricted by the corporations‟ bylaws, 
giving rise, as is common, to preferred shares with limited, or no 
voting rights. A longstanding debate surrounds the existence of 
nonvoting preferred stocks in Brazil. In line with the original 
justification for their creation in the 1970s, some authors hold that 
preferred stock is a practical and effective alternative for 
corporations to raise capital.
60
 Accordingly, the market itself would 
determine the value of non-voting stock, while allowing business 
groups to reach the stock markets without having to share control. 
Other authors believe that lack of voting rights is intrinsically 
detrimental to minorities and to the development of the stock 
markets more broadly.
61
 As previously mentioned, the 
Corporations Law currently allows listed corporations to issue 
nonvoting preferred stock corresponding to up to 50% of the total 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
60. See 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI 
DAS S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO, APLICAÇÃO 182-197 (3d ed. 1997) 
(examining the historical debates surrounding the enactment of the Corporations 
Law in the 70s decade); see also Arnoldo Wald, Em Defesa das Ações 
Preferenciais, 78 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 19-23 (1990); Mauro 
Rodrigues Penteado, Ações Preferenciais, in JORGE LOBO, REFORMA DA LEI DAS 
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS: INOVAÇÕES E QUESTÕES CONTROVERTIDAS DA LEI n. 
10.303, de 31.10.2001 (2002); NELSON EIZIRIK, REFORMA DAS S.A. E DO 
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS  29-52 (2d ed. 1998). 
61. That was the official opinion held by the Rio de Janeiro Stock 
Exchange in the course of the debated surrounding the Corporations Law in the 
70; See ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A. 
190-205 (1992); See also Érica Gorga, Análise da Eficiência de Normas 
Societárias: Emissão de Preferenciais, Tag Along e Composição do Conselho 
Fiscal, Berkley Program in Law & Economics, Latin American and Caribbean 
Law and Economics Association (ALACDE), Annual Paper 050307-01, 
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xd441jc (last visited April 21, 
2011). 
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capital stock.
62
 It must be noted, moreover, that nonvoting 
preferred shares automatically acquire voting rights when the 
corporation fails to pay the fixed or minimum dividend to which a 
certain stock is entitled; and such rights to vote endure until 
payment has been made, if the dividend is not cumulative, or until 
all cumulative dividends in arrears have been paid.
63
 
Minority shareholders can also supervise the actions of 
controlling groups by appointing members to the board of 
directors.
64
 Minority shareholders representing at least 10% of the 
voting capital have the right to request a multiple voting (“voto 
múltiplo”) for the election of the members of the board of 
directors.
65
 Multiple voting is a mechanism whereby each voting 
stock is given the right to make as many votes as the number of 
vacant positions in the board of directors. For instance, if the 
shareholders are electing five board members, each voting stock 
will cast five votes. By concentrating all votes in one or two 
candidates, this procedure empowers minorities to elect at least a 
small number of board members.
66
  
It should also be noted that the 2001 reform to the Corporations 
Law established other means for the participation of minority 
shareholders in electing the Board of Directors. Minority 
shareholders representing 15% of the voting stocks can elect a 
member for the board of directors.
67
 This same right was extended 
to shareholders having nonvoting preferred stocks that represent at 
least 10% of the corporation‟s total stock capital.68 In addition, 
corporations listed in the special listing segments follow more 
stringent rules: the board of directors of corporations listed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
62.  See supra note 28.  
63.  Corporations Law, art. 111; see also ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO 
E NOVAES FRANÇA, TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO, FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA 
EMPRESA 483-508 (2009). 
64.  See Nelson Eizirik, Ações preferenciais, Não pagamento de 
dividendos. Aquisição do direito de voto, 146 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 
23-29 (2007) (arguing that the right to appoint members of the board of directors 
only applies to shareholders having right to fixed or minimum dividends). 
65.  Corporations Law, art. 141. 
66.  Id. at art. 141 (providing that even if the election of the Board of 
Directors is conducted through multiple voting, the shareholders bound by 
voting agreements representing more than 50% of voting stocks will have the 
right to appoint the same number of members appointed by the remaining 
shareholders plus one, regardless of the number of board members specified in 
the bylaws).  
67.  Id. at art. 141, §4, I. 
68.  Id. at art. 141, §4, II. 
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Novo Mercado and in Level 2 must be composed of at least five 
members, 20% of which must be independent directors.
69
 
However, controlling shareholders retain the right to appoint the 
majority of the members of the board of directors in any case.
70
 
Because of this, the right to be represented within the board of 
directors does not necessarily cause minority shareholders to have 
the power to actively influence decision-making within the board 
of directors. Nevertheless, representation within the board of 
directors creates at least an additional instance where minorities 
can obtain information about the corporations‟ business and 
sometimes oppose or question resolutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
69.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 4.3 & Corporate Governance 
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 5.3. (An “Independent Member” is defined as “a 
member of the Board of Directors who: (i) has no ties to the Company except 
for owning an equity share of its capital stock; (ii) is not a Controlling 
Shareholder, the Controlling Shareholder‟s spouse or a relative to the second 
degree, is not or has not been linked in the last 3 (three) years to a company or 
entity with ties to the Controlling Shareholder (this restriction does not apply to 
people linked to governmental institutions of education and research); (iii) has 
not been a Senior Manager of the Company or employed by or worked for the 
Company, the Controlling Shareholder or any other company controlled by the 
Company; (iv) is not a direct or indirect supplier or purchaser of the Company‟s 
services or products or both, to a degree that results in loss of independency; (v) 
is not an employee or manager of a company or entity that supplies services or 
products or both to, or buys these from, the Company; (vi) is not a spouse or a 
relative to the second degree of any Senior Manager of the Company; (vii) does 
not receive any compensation from the Company except for that related to its 
activities as member of the Board of Directors (this restriction does not apply to 
cash from equity interests in the capital stock.”)); see Rafael Liza Santos, 
Alexandre di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Board 
Interlocking in Brazil: Directors’ Participation in Multiple Companies and its 
Effect on Firm Value, Jan. 2009, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018796 (last visited April 
21, 2011) (showing that having interlocking directorates is a common practice in 
Brazilian corporations, and also that larger boards, dispersed ownership, and 
larger corporation size are associated with higher levels of board interlocking 
and lower stock value). 
70.  The legal regime governing the participation of minority 
shareholders in the Board of Directors has been the subject of much legal 
controversy. The CVM has twice ruled on the subject. Firstly, it decided that, if 
the corporation has no preferred stocks, voting shareholders owning 10% of the 
total capital can appoint a member to the Board of Directors (even though the 
Corporations Law establishes a 15% requirement). See CVM/RJ Administrative 
Procedure 2005/5564 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 2005/5564”), 
avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/respdecis.asp?File=4846-2.HTM. 
Secondly, upon a formal consultation, the CVM decided that if a shareholders 
exercises its right to appoint a member to the Board of Directors in a separate 
election at the general meeting, it cannot make use of multiple voting. See 
“Consulta de Ultrapar Participações S.A. sobre Eleição de Conselheiros, Reg. 
3649/02,” avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2002-
016D16042002.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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B. Economic Rights 
 
Stock value is a function of the bundle of rights contained in 
each stock. Thus, most (if not all) of the individual rights contained 
in the Corporations Law are in some sense “economic” rights, 
because the stock valuation presumably reflects the present value 
of these rights—even if imperfectly so. Here, however, the 
expression “economic rights” is employed in the narrower sense 
typically used in doctrinal studies of Brazilian corporate law.
71
 
From this perspective, the basic economic rights are the right to 
receive dividends, tag along rights, dissent and appraisal rights, 
and rights of first refusal. 
To begin with, in principle, at least 25% of the corporation‟s 
yearly net profits must be paid as dividends. The corporation‟s 
bylaws can however establish a lower percentage.
72
 In addition, the 
percentage of the net profits that have to be paid out as dividends 
for the different types of stocks is flexible.
73
 Nonvoting preferred 
stock can only be accepted for trading in the stock market if they 
are afforded at least one of three advantages: a priority in the 
receipt of dividends corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s net 
worth, dividends at least 10% higher than the dividend assigned to 
the voting stocks, or the same tag along rights as those held by 
voting shareholders (that is, tag along rights with tender offer value 
based on 80% of the price paid to controlling shareholders).
74
 
Tag along rights have also been dealt with under the rubric of 
“economic rights.” The existence of tag along means that the 
purchaser of a controlling stake of a corporation must make a 
tender offer to holders of minority shares.
75
 As previously 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
71.  See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, DO DIREITO DO 
ACIONISTA AO DIVIDENDO (1969); DIVIDENDO OBRIGATÓRIO E PARTICIPAÇÃO 
DOS ADMINISTRADORES NOS LUCROS DA COMPANHIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES 
SOBRE SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (Revista dos Tribunais 1989) (examining the 
right to receive dividends). 
72.  Corporations Law, art. 17. (announcing that the yearly net income 
should be calculated as set forth under article 202 of the Corporations Law and 
according to the following criteria: (i) a priority in the receipt of dividends 
corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s equity value; and (ii) the right to 
have interest in the profit distributed in conditions equal to the common stocks, 
after a dividend equal to the minimum priority as set forth in item a is assured.).  
73. Id. at art. 202, § 2d. 
74.  Id. at art. 17. 
75.  The Corporations Law defines a transfer of control as “transfer, 
whether direct or indirect, of stocks comprising the controlling block, of stocks 
bound by shareholders‟ agreements and of securities convertible into voting 
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mentioned, the 2001 reforms of the Corporations Law reinstated 
tag along rights, albeit in a limited fashion. Mandatory tag along 
rights were made applicable only to bearers of voting shares, and 
tender offers can be limited to 80% of the price paid for the block 
of controlling shares.
76
 In addition, the 2001 reformation also 
established an alternative mechanism for companies seeking to 
acquire control of listed corporations to remunerate minority 
shareholders. As currently set forth under the Corporations Law, 
purchasers can decide to offer minority shareholders the option to 
keep their holdings in the corporation in exchange for payment of a 
premium.
77
 This premium should be equivalent to the difference 
between the market value of the stocks and the amount paid for 
shares comprising the controlling block.  
The special listing segments establish more stringent rules. In 
the Novo Mercado, where nonvoting preferred stocks are 
forbidden, full tag along rights apply to all minority stocks.
78
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
stocks, assignment of stock subscription rights and other rights related to 
securities convertible into stocks which may result in the transfer of corporate 
control.” (art. 254, § 1st ). In addition, CVM Ordinance No. 361 of 2002 defines 
transfer of control as the “operation, or a set of operations, of securities 
alienation with voting rights, or to which are convertible, or of onerous 
assignment of subscription rights to these securities, performed by the 
controlling shareholder or by people which are partners of the control group, by 
which a third party or a group of third parties representing same interests acquire 
the corporation control power, as defined in the art. 116 of the [Corporations 
Law].” The aforementioned art. 116 of the Corporations Law defines controlling 
shareholder as “an individual or a legal entity, or a group of individuals or legal 
entities by a voting agreement or under common control, which: (a) possesses 
rights which permanently assure it a majority of votes in resolutions of general 
meetings and the power to elect a majority of the corporation officers; and (b) in 
practice uses its power to direct the corporate activities and to guide the 
operations of the departments of the corporation.” 
76.  In practice, the debates over the exact events that trigger a transfer of 
control tend to end in controversy. A famous case involving this topic was the 
sale of Telecom Italia, which is the indirect controller of TIM, which provides 
cell phone services in Brazil. In a non-unanimous decision, the CVM ruled that 
a tender offer was mandatory. However, each member of CVM‟s decisions body 
justified his vote on different grounds available at: 
www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2009-026ED15072009.htm (last 
visited April 21, 2011). See also GUILHERME DÖRING CUNHA PEREIRA, 
ALIENAÇÃO DO PODER DE CONTROLE ACIONÁRIO (1995); ROBERTA NIOAC 
PRADO, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE AÇÕES OBRIGATÓRIA NAS S.A.: TAG ALONG 
(2005); CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, Alienação de Controle: O Vaivém da 
Disciplina e seus Problemas, in O NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 117-140 (2d. ed. 
2002). 
77.  Corporations Law, art. 254, § 4th. 
78.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 8.1. 
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same rule applies to the voting common stocks traded at Level 2.
79
 
This listing segment allows corporations to issue nonvoting 
preferred stocks, but the latter must be granted tag along rights 
corresponding to least 80% of the value/conditions applicable to 
the controlling group.
80
 
The Corporations Law also establishes an appraisal right 
(“direito de recesso”) for shareholders dissenting from certain 
corporate resolutions. Appraisal rights can be triggered by the 
following events: a change in the proportion of classes of stock 
that causes a loss to the dissenting shareholder (unless this is 
expressly allowed for in the bylaws), a change in the redemption or 
amortization terms of one or more classes of preferred shares, or 
the creation of a new, more favored class that causes a loss to the 
dissenting shareholders.
81
 The dissent and appraisal right will also 
be triggered by a reduction of the compulsory dividend or a change 
in the corporate purpose.
82
 Dissenting shareholders of listed 
corporations that own illiquid stocks can also request the appraisal 
of their stocks in case of merger or incorporation by another 
company or participation in a “group of corporations.”83 The same 
appraisal rights also apply in case of a spin-off of the corporation, 
but only if the spin-off results in a change in the corporate 
purposes (except when the spun-off assets are transferred to a 
company with a main line of business that coincides with that of 
the corporation originally spun-off), if there is a reduction in the 
mandatory dividend, or if the spin-off causes shareholders to join a 
group of corporations.
84
  
The bylaws can establish the criteria for appraisal of the stocks 
of dissenting shareholders, subject to a minimum value based on 
the book value of the corporation as recorded in the latest financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
79.  Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 8.1. 
80.  Id. at item 8.1.3. 
81.  Corporations Law, art. 137, I, & art. 136, I and II (providing that in 
these cases, appraisal rights will apply only if the shareholder was harmed by the 
transaction). 
82.  Id. at art. 137, main provision, & art. 136, III and VI. 
83.  Id. at art. 137, II & art. 136, IV and V. The Corporations Law states 
that in these cases, the holders of stocks of a class or type that have market 
liquidity and dispersion shall not have the right to withdraw, provided that: 
liquidity is evidenced when the type or class of stock, or the certificate that 
represents it, is part of a general index representing a portfolio of securities in 
Brazil or abroad, defined by the CVM; and dispersion is evidenced when the 
majority shareholder, the controlling corporation or other corporations under 
their control hold less than half of issued stocks of the applicable type or class.  
84.  Id. at art. 137, III & art. 136, IX. 
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statements.
85
 That said, appraising stock in concrete cases often 
gives rise to controversies and lawsuits.
86
 In Brazil, this is 
particularly common in transactions involving the incorporation of 
a controlled company.
87
 The Corporations Law establishes that in 
these cases the exchange ratio of stock shall be based on the net 
worth value of the shares of both controlling and controlled 
companies, the assets and liabilities (of both of them) valued 
pursuant to the same criteria and on the same date, at market 
prices, or according to another criteria indicated by the CVM.
88
 
However, if the conditions for the exchange of the stock of the 
non-controlling shareholders are considered less advantageous than 
those resulting from such criteria, dissenting shareholders have the 
right to choose between having the exchange ratio adjusted or 
having their stock appraised and refunded.
89
 To mitigate the 
problems associated with conflicting of interests that inevitable 
arise in these kinds of transactions, in 2008 the CVM enacted a 
Guideline Opinion (“Parecer Orientação No. 35/2008”) 
containing a number of procedures to be followed during the 
negotiation of the merger protocol (including those involving 
downstream mergers). These procedures include the creation of an 
independent committee to opine on the fairness of the merger. 
As of 2001, delisting is only possible if the corporation that 
issued the stock, the majority shareholders, or the controlling 
corporation makes a tender offer to acquire the outstanding 
shares.
90
 The price of the tender offer will be calculated based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
85.  Id. at art. 45, § 1st. 
86.  See Mary Siegel, Back To The Future: Appraisal Rights In The 
Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995) (surveying the history of 
the remedy in the United States). 
87.  A leading case on this topic involves VASP, formerly a Brazilian 
airline corporation which went out of business after bankruptcy. The CVM 
examined the exchange ratio of stocks and ruled in favor of the minority 
shareholders. See CVM Administrative Procedure 23/99 (“Processo 
Administrativo Sancionador 23/99”). Another leading case was the 
incorporation of Banco Santander Noroeste S.A. by its controlling company, 
Banco Santander Brasil S.A. After the CVM ruled in favor of minority 
shareholders, Banco Santander appealed in court, but the CVM decision was 
ratified. See CVM Administrative Procedure 24/04 (“Processo Administrativo 
Sancionador 24/04”) and decisions by the São Paulo Appeal Court (“Tribunal de 
Justiça de São Paulo”) Nos. 510.984-4/8, 219.385-4/2, and 516.357-4/0. 
88.  Corporations Law, art. 264. 
89.  Id. at art. 264, § 3d. 
90.  In Brazil, there is no distinction between admission to listing and 
admission to trading. Once a corporation goes public, all of its securities may be 
negotiated on a stock exchange (or on the OTC market) as long as the more 
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one or more of the following criteria: net assets appraised at 
market value, discounted cash flow, comparison by multiples, 
share quotation in the securities market, or other criteria adopted 
by the CVM.
91
 If less than 5% of all stocks issued by the 
corporation are outstanding after the expiration of the tender offer, 
the corporation can unilaterally decide to redeem these outstanding 
shares (squeeze out).
92
 For corporations listed in the Novo 
Mercado or in Level 2, the valuation for the tender offer cannot be 
lower than the economic stock value.
93
 
Finally, shareholders have a right of first refusal for the 
subscription of a capital increase in proportion to the number of 
shares they currently own.
94
 In order to avoid capital increases 
made only for the purpose of diluting minority holders, the 
Corporations Law requires that every proposal to increase the 
corporation‟s capital contain a detailed explanation of why the 
capital increase is necessary and the criteria used for the 
calculation of the price of the stocks being issued.
95
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
specific trading requirements are complied with. Currently, the only Brazilian 
stock exchange trading stocks is BM&FBovespa. To be admitted to listing and, 
consequently, to have its securities admitted to trading, a corporation must also 
be registered with the CVM. 
91.  Corporations Law, art. 4, § 4th. 
92.  Id. at art. 4, § 5th. 
93.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 10.1 and Corporate Governance 
Level 1 Listing Rules, item 10.1. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also 
established that if the controlling shareholder acquires stocks of a listed 
corporation that is already under his control, and these stocks increase his 
interest in a certain class of stocks in a way that reduces the market liquidity of 
the remaining stocks, the controlling shareholder must make a tender offer for 
such remaining stocks (Corporations Law, art. 4, § 6th). CVM Ordinance No. 
361 of 2002, art. 26, established that such tender offer should be performed 
whenever the controlling shareholder acquires directly or indirectly, other than 
through an IPO, stocks which represent more than a 1/3 of the total stocks of 
each type or class of stocks of the corporation. 
94.  Corporations Law, art. 171. The message from the house 
(“exposição de motivos”) grounding the Corporations Law contended that the 
“the elimination [of the right of first refusal] in listed companies is permitted 
only where the right of first refusal, besides rendering it difficult the 
organization and distribution of the issued stocks in the market, has no 
importance as an instrument for the protection of shareholders against the 
change of their capital stake, because anyone can acquire stocks in the market.” 
See Erasmo Valladão Azevedo & Novaes França, A Proteção dos Credores e 
Acionistas nos Aumentos de Capital Social, in TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO, 
FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA EMPRESA 230-252 (São Paulo, Malheiros 2009); 2 
MODESTO CARVALHOSA, COMENTÁRIOS À LEI DAS SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 290 
(São Paulo, Saraiva 1997).  
95.  Corporations Law, art. 170. The criteria for calculation of issuance 
price can only be the expected profitability of the corporation, the equity value, 
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C. Oversight and Information Rights 
 
Minority shareholders typically exercise their oversight and 
information rights through the statutory audit committee 
(“conselho fiscal”). The corporation‟s bylaws can, but need not, 
require the audit committee to function indefinitely.
96
 When the 
audit committee is not permanent, it can be brought to act upon the 
request of shareholders representing 10% of the corporation‟s 
voting stocks or 5% of the corporation‟s nonvoting stocks.97 All of 
the preferred shareholders holding nonvoting or restricted voting 
shares can jointly appoint a member of the audit committee in a 
separate voting session, and that same right is granted to minority 
shareholders who own at least 10% of the voting capital.
98
 
However, the ability of minority shareholders to restrict the 
controlling group of shareholders by means of the audit committee 
is limited because the law guarantees the right of the controlling 
group to appoint the majority of the members of the audit 
committee.
99
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
or market value. See MAURO RODRIGUES PENTEADO, AUMENTO DE CAPITAL DAS 
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (1988). 
96.  Corporations Law, art. 161. 
97.  Id. CVM Instruction No. 324 reduces the percentages of votes 
necessary to bring audit committees into action proportionally to the 
corporation‟s capital. 
98.  The CVM recently issued a formal warning against the chairman of 
a shareholders‟ meeting for him having blocked the attempt of a minority 
shareholder to appoint a member to the audit committee based merely on formal 
considerations. See CVM/RJ Administrative Procedure 2008/12062 (“Processo 
Administrativo Sancionador 2008/12062”), available at 
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/TA%20RJ2008-
12062%20 Telebr%C3%A1s (last visited April 21, 2011). 
99.  Corporations Law, art. 161, § 4th. See also CVM Guideline Opinion 
No. 19/1990 (“Parecer Orientação No. 19/1990”) establishing that the 
controlling shareholder cannot appoint members to the audit committee using its 
preferred, nonvoting stocks. Recently there have been cases where controlling 
shareholders acted contrarily to this CVM guideline, and the CVM ruled such 
appointments illegal. See CVM Administrative Procedure 02/07 (“Processo 
Administrativo Sancionador 02/07”), where the CVM found abusive the 
appointment to the audit committee of persons connected to the controlling 
shareholder, where such appointment was made in a separate voting available at 
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/IA%2002-
07%20T%C3%AAxtil% 20Renaux%20SA.asp. Other cases on this topic 
include CVM Administrative Procedure 20/04 (“Processo Administrativo 
Sancionador 20/04”), available at www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2008/ 
rordinario/inqueritos/IA% 2020-04%20Springer.asp; CVM Administrative 
Procedure 07/05 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 07/05”), available at 
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2007/rordinario/inqueritos/04_24_07-05.asp; 
and CVM Administrative Procedure 2002/4985 (“Processo Administrativo 
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The audit committee does not have powers to make corporate 
resolutions. Nevertheless, its members can individually give an 
opinion about certain topics, particularly as regards the integrity of 
the management‟s actions and the fulfillment by the officers of 
their legal duties.
100
 Upon the request of any of its members, the 
audit committee can also request information from the 
administrative bodies, as well as require the preparation of special 
financial or accounting statements.
101
 In addition, the audit 
committee opines on the management‟s annual report and on the 
management‟s proposals and plans to increase corporate capital, to 
make new investments, to distribute dividends and to undergo 
incorporations, mergers or spin-off transactions.
102
 Moreover, it is 
in charge of calling shareholders‟ meeting if the officers fail to 
timely do so, and of examining the corporation‟s books on a 
quarterly basis.
103
 
Minority shareholders can also act independently of the audit 
committee. At the request of shareholders representing at least 5% 
of the total stock capital, a complete inspection of the books of the 
corporation may be ordered by the court, whenever acts contrary to 
the law or to the bylaws occur, or there are grounds to suspect that 
serious irregularities may be present.
104
 
Brazilian listed corporations must publish annual financial 
statements that should include a balance sheet, a statement of 
retained earnings, a statement of income and a statement of 
changes in financial position.
105
 In December of 2007, the section 
of the Corporations Law dealing with financial statements was 
amended with a view toward bringing Brazilian GAAP closer to 
international accounting standards.
106
 These amendments created 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sancionador 2002/4985”), available at www.cvm.gov.br/port/ 
inqueritos/2005/rordinario/inqueritos/11_08_RJ2002-4985.asp) (last visited 
April 21, 2011). 
100.  Corporations Law, art. 163. 
101.  Id. at art. 163, § 2d. 
102.  Id. at art. 163, III. 
103.  Id. at art. 163 V & VI. 
104.  Id. at art. 105. 
105.  Id. at art. 176.  
106.  Federal Law No. 11,638 of 2007. Furthermore, CVM Ordinance No. 
457 of 2007 has established that “listed companies shall, starting from reporting 
periods ending in 2010, present their consolidated financial statements according 
to International Financial Reporting Standards-IFRS, as issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board-IASB . . . Until the reporting period 
ending in 2009, public corporations may, optionally, present their consolidated 
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the statement of cash flows and the value added statement, 
changed rules concerning accounting criteria and methods, 
classification of assets, restrictions for the use of deferred asset 
accounts, established criteria for valuation of cash equivalents, 
intangible assets and assets allocated to long-term operations and 
long-term liabilities. In addition, a few regulations have been 
issued more recently with to the goal of standardizing information 
available to regulators and investors. Under CVM Ordinance n. 
480, of 2009, issuers are required to send periodical information to 
CVM according to a new format and to keep the data available for 
investors (including on their webpage) for three years.
107
 Chiefly 
among such information to be disclosed is that involving 
transactions with related parties and the remuneration of officers 
and directors.
108
 
Corporations listed at BM&FBovespa‟s special segments face 
higher disclosure requirements. At the Novo Mercado and at Level 
2, corporations must prepare annual balance sheets pursuant to 
international accounting standards (US GAAP or IFRS), thereby 
improving the quality (and quantity) of information that is publicly 
available.
109
 These corporations must disclose the existence of 
their securities that are held by controlling shareholders.
110
 They 
also hold public meetings with analysts and investors at least once 
a year, present an annual calendar with the relevant events for the 
forthcoming year (such as the dates of shareholder meetings, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
financial statements in accordance with IFRS as issued by IASB, in lieu of 
Brazilian accounting standards.” 
107.  CVM Ordinance No. 480 of 2009, art. 13, §§ 1st and 2d. 
108.  Under the argument that it violated a constitutional right to privacy, 
the Brazilian Institute of Finance Executives of Rio de Janeiro (IBEF-Instituto 
Brasileiro dos Executivos de Finanças do Rio de Janeiro) questioned in court the 
constitutionality of the requirement on the remuneration of administrators. The 
CVM wants listed corporations to disclose the maximum, average, and 
minimum remuneration of the members of the board of officers and board of 
directors. The IBEF accepts the disclosure of global amounts, but contends that 
the illegality lies in that the proposed scheme allows the public to identify the 
CEO‟s compensation. The IBEF obtained a provisional remedy (“medida 
cautelar”) allowing its members not to disclose information on remuneration. 
See SLS 1.210-RJ, Justice Cesar Asfor Rocha, April 13, 2010 available at 
www.stj.gov.br (last visited April 21, 2011). 
109.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.2 and Corporate Governance 
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 6.2. 
110.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 9.1; Corporate Governance Level 
2 Listing Rules, item 9.1; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item 
6.1. 
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release of financial results, etc.),
111
 present detailed information 
about related party transactions,
112
 and disclose on a monthly basis 
a summary of the transactions with derivatives and securities of the 
corporation that were carried out by the controlling 
shareholders.
113
 
Officers of listed corporations have to inform the stock 
exchange, as well as publish in the press, any resolution of a 
general meeting or of the corporation's managing bodies. Further, 
they must disclose any material events which occur in the course 
of business that may substantially influence the market price of the 
securities issued by the corporation, or the decision of investors to 
sell, buy, or exercise any right pertaining to the corporation‟s 
securities.
114
 Under current CVM regulations, material events 
include the signing of contracts for the transfer of control of the 
corporation (even if under conditional provisions), changes in the 
control of the corporation (including through the execution, or 
amendments to a shareholder agreement), the authorization for 
listing securities issued by the corporation (in any domestic or 
foreign markets), changes in accounting criteria, and approval of 
stock options plans, among others.
115
 Furthermore, CVM 
regulations require the disclosure of information about sales of 5% 
blocks of voting stock or more. Disclosure is also necessary when 
the ownership of a type or class of stocks reaches 5% (or is 
reduced by 5%) of the total of such type or class.
116
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
111.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; Corporate 
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; and Corporate Governance 
Level 1 Listing Rules, items 4.4 and 4.5.  
112.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.8; Corporate Governance Level 
2 Listing Rules, item 6.8; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item 
4.6. 
113.  Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; Corporate 
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; and Corporate 
Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, items 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. 
114.  Corporations Law, art. 157 (Officers may however refuse to disclose 
such information when they feel that such disclosure would subject a legitimate 
interest of the corporation to risk (CVM Ordinance No. 258 of 2002)). 
115.  CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002. 
116.  CVM Ordinance No. 299 of 1999, art. 6; and CVM Ordinance No. 
358 of 2002, art. 11 (administrators) and art. 12 (shareholders). (providing that 
corporations listed in BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments must also 
disclose any direct or indirect ownership interest exceeding 5% of the 
corporation‟s capital stock, up to the level of individual shareholders (Novo 
Mercado Listing Rules, item 7.2, XV; Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing 
Rules, item 7.2, (XV); Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item 5.2, 
(XV). 
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D. Procedural Rights 
 
Procedural rights are the inherent abilities to litigate and to 
demand legal remedies in court. Lawsuits against officers can be 
brought to court by the corporation upon the request of the 
minority shareholders, similarly to American-style derivative 
lawsuits.
117
 However, the effectiveness of these lawsuits is 
impaired by the fact that the shareholders‟ meeting (and not the 
board of directors, as typically occurs in the United States) has to 
approve them; and controlling shareholders have historically 
disfavored such lawsuits.
118
 These efforts are further hampered by 
the fact that in Brazil it is still common for officers to have close 
personal ties (often family ties) with the controlling group. 
If the shareholders‟ meeting fails to approve the filing of 
derivative lawsuits, minority shareholders representing at least 5% 
of the corporation‟s aggregate stock capital may still file the 
claim.
119
 But the incentives for minority shareholders to file such 
claims are low, because they will bear the initial costs of the 
lawsuit and the verdict—which is somewhat uncertain and 
typically takes a long time—will go to the corporation. Hence, 
derivative lawsuits against officers are rare. Arguably, the 
procedural mechanism that could really protect minority 
shareholders is class action lawsuits. However, Brazilian 
procedural laws do not make room for them. The result is that 
minority shareholders remain more likely than controlling 
shareholders to be hurt by actions of the officers. After all, if 
officers hurt the controlling group they can be easily dismissed; yet 
if they hurt only the minorities, they remain unlikely to be sued. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
117.  A shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit instigated by a shareholder 
of a corporation, not on the shareholder‟s own behalf, but on behalf of the 
corporation. The shareholder brings an action in the name of the corporation 
against the parties allegedly causing harm to the corporation. Often derivative 
suits are brought against officers or directors of a corporation for violations of 
fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation. Any 
proceeds of a successful action are rewarded to the corporation. 
118.  Any shareholder may bring the action if proceedings are not 
instituted within three months from the date of the resolution of the 
shareholders‟ meeting approving the lawsuit. Corporations Law, art. 159. 
119.  Id. at art. 159. 
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E. Indirect Protection 
 
Minority shareholders may also be indirectly protected through 
a number of legal remedies that aim at safeguarding the 
corporation from value-destructing actions of its controlling 
shareholders and officers. These are means of “indirect” protection 
because the immediate focus is on the protection of the 
corporation, and the minority shareholders only benefit from such 
actions to the extent that the improvement of the corporation‟s 
state of affairs enhances their stock value and dividends payments.  
The Corporations Law rules the exercise of voting in 
shareholder meetings and the exercise of controlling power in the 
course of the corporation‟s businesses. Accordingly, each 
shareholder has a legal duty to vote in the corporation‟s interest.120 
In practice, a vote will be deemed “abusive” if it is exercised with 
the intent to cause damage to the corporation or to other 
shareholders, or of obtaining an advantage for the shareholder or 
for a third party to which neither is entitled, and which results or 
may result in damage to the corporation or to other shareholders.
121
 
In addition, each shareholder is barred from voting on any 
corporate resolutions dealing with the evaluation report on the 
property which he contributed to form the corporation's capital, or 
on the approval of his own accounts as officer, or on any other 
resolution which may benefit him personally or in which he and 
the corporation may have conflicting interests.
122
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
120.  Id. at art. 115. 
121.  Id. 
122. See id; Carvalhosa supra note 95, at 264 (both contending that the 
verification of the conflict of interests require a formal, abstract and a priori 
examination of the position of each shareholder in face of the corporation and 
the law). But see FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO, CONTROLE CONJUNTO, ABUSO 
NO EXERCÍCIO DO VOTO ACIONÁRIO E ALIENAÇÃO INDIRETA DE CONTROLE 
EMPRESARIAL, DIREITO EMPRESARIAL, ESTUDOS E PARECERES 89 (1995) 
(arguing that the prohibition for voting under certain circumstances should be 
interpreted in such way that no shareholder shall obtain an advantage at the 
expense of other shareholders). See also LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, 
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES, ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE SOCIEDADES 
ANÔNIMAS 9-27 (1989); ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO E NOVAES FRANÇA, 
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES NAS ASSEMBLÉIAS DE S.A. 91 (1993); José Alexandre 
Tavares Guerreiro, Conflito entre Sociedade Controladora e Controlada e ente 
Coligadas, No Exercício do Voto em Assembléias Gerais e Reuniões Sociais, in 
51 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 30 (1983) (all arguing that issues of 
conflicts of interest should be approached a posteriori and on a case-by-case 
basis). The CVM decisions do not follow a clear pattern. See Administrative 
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) RJ 2001/4977 (deciding that a controlling 
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Controlling shareholders are required to use their controlling 
powers in order to make the corporation accomplish its purpose 
and perform its “social function,”123 and have duties and 
responsibilities to the other shareholders of the corporation, to 
those who work for the corporation and to the community in which 
it operates, the rights and interests of which the controlling 
shareholder must loyally respect and heed.
124
 The Corporations 
Law also contains a detailed description of the duties and 
responsibilities of the corporation‟s officers.125 Officers generally 
have fiduciary duties of diligence
126
 and loyalty, as is common in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shareholder is a priori prevented from approving the payment of royalties under 
a contract to be entered into with the indirect controlling company). For a 
comment on this decision, see Erasmo Valadão Azevedo e Novaes França in 
125 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 140-170 (2002). But see Administrative 
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) CVM 2002/1153 (deciding that conflicts of 
interest should be analyzed a posteriori and on a case-by-case basis in order to 
verify whether there is an actual loss for the corporation).  
123.  See Fábio Konder Comparato, A Reforma da Empresa, in DIREITO 
EMPRESARIAL. ESTUDOS E PARECERES (1995) (examining the so-called “social 
function” of corporations). 
124.  Corporations Law, article 117, § 1st contains a non-exhaustive list of 
“abusive” actions which includes those circumstances where controlling 
shareholders (i) guide the corporation towards an objective other than in 
accordance with its corporate purposes clause or harmful to national interest, (ii) 
provide for the liquidation of a viable corporation or for the transformation, 
merger or spin-off of a corporation in order to obtain, for itself or for a third 
party, any undue advantage to the detriment of the other shareholders, of those 
working for the corporation or of investors in securities issued by the 
corporation, (iii) to provide for a statutory amendment, an issue of securities or 
an adoption of policies or decisions which are not in the best interests of the 
corporation but are intended to cause damage to the minority shareholders, to 
those working for the corporation or to investors in securities issued by the 
corporation, (iv) elect a corporation officer or audit committee member known 
to be unfit for the position or unqualified, (v) induce, or attempt to induce, any 
officer or audit committee member to take any unlawful action, or, contrary to 
their duties under this Law and under the bylaws, and contrary to the interest of 
the corporation, to ratify any such action in a general meeting, (vi) sign contracts 
with the corporation directly, through a third party or through a business in 
which the controlling shareholder has an interest, incorporating unduly favorable 
or inequitable terms, (vii) approve, or cause to be approved, irregular accounts 
rendered by corporation officers as a personal favor, or to fail to verify a 
complaint which he knows, or should know, to be well founded, or which gives 
grounds for a reasonable suspicion of irregularity, and (viii) subscribe stocks 
with the contribution of property unrelated to the purpose of the corporation. See 
also FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO & CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O PODER DE 
CONTROLE NA SOCIEDADE ANÔNIMA (4th ed. 2005). 
125.  Corporations Law, arts. 153-160. 
126.  Brazilian case law on the duty of diligence is murky and offers no 
clear articulation of a “Business Judgment Rule” or similar doctrine. The 
Corporations Law states that the “officer shall not be personally liable for the 
commitments he undertakes on behalf of the corporation and by virtue of action 
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modern corporate legislation around the world.
127
 There are also 
responsibilities that apply to the corporation itself. For instance, 
the corporation is liable for any loss caused to interested parties by 
errors or irregularities found in its corporate books.
128
 
The restrictions against trading stocks based on privileged 
information held by officers and controlling shareholders is 
another form of indirect protection of minority shareholders. The 
prohibition against insider trading had been inserted in the 
Corporations Law since its inception in 1976, but until recently 
enforcement was rare. It was only with the 2001 reform to the 
Corporations Law that the practice of insider trading was classified 
as a criminal offense.
129
 However, it was not until 2009 that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
taken in the ordinary course of business; he shall, however, be liable for any loss 
caused when he acts: (i) within the scope of his authority, with fault or fraud; (ii) 
contrary to the provisions of the law or of the bylaws.” Corporations Law, art. 
158. The 2008 financial crisis led to large losses to some listed corporations 
exposed to foreign exchange fluctuation in derivatives markets. Noteworthy 
cases include those of Sadia and Aracruz. In these cases, the corporations sued 
some of their officers, particularly their chief financial officers (source: Sadia‟s 
minutes of shareholders meeting (“assembléia geral extraordinária”) dated as of 
April 6, 2009, and Aracruz‟ minutes of shareholders meeting dated as of 
November 24, 2008, both available at www.cvm.gov.br (last visited April 21, 
2011). Completion of these lawsuits is expected to still take many years. 
127.  Under Brazilian Law, each officer is prohibited from performing any 
acts of generosity to the detriment of the corporation; borrowing money or 
property from the corporation or using its property, services or taking advantage 
of its standing for his own benefit or for the benefit of a corporation in which he 
has an interest or of a third party, without the prior approval of a general 
meeting or the administrative council; by virtue of his position, receiving any 
type of direct, or indirect, personal advantage from third parties, without 
authorization in the bylaws or from a general meeting; usurping a commercial 
opportunity which may come to his knowledge, by virtue of his position, for his 
own benefit or that of a third party (even if this is not harmful to the 
corporation); failing to exercise or protect corporation rights or, in seeking to 
obtain advantages for himself or for a third party, failing to make use of a 
commercial opportunity which he knows to be of interest to the corporation 
(although the law allows officers to contract with the corporation on arm-length 
basis); acquiring for resale at a profit property or rights which he knows the 
corporation needs or which the corporation intends to acquire. Corporations 
Law, arts. 154 and 155. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also included 
an express prohibition against insider trading. Art. 155 of the Corporations Law 
now states that “any officer who may receive any confidential information not 
yet revealed to the public shall not make use of such information to obtain any 
advantages for himself or for third parties by purchasing or selling securities.” 
128.  Corporations Law, art. 104. 
129.  Id. at art. 155, § 4t and art. 117. CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984 
reinforced the prohibition to administrators and controlling shareholders to use 
privileged information for the obtainment of personal advantages while trading 
with securities. In fact, CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984 extended such 
prohibition to any person that could gain access to privileged information due to 
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public prosecution and the CVM filed the first lawsuit based on 
charges of insider trading. Charges were brought against persons 
involved in the merger of Perdigão and Sadia that occurred in 
2006.
130
 
In spite of the myriad of regulations on the topic, the effective 
protection of minorities in Brazilian stock markets still hinges on at 
least two factors. First, on the improvement of the formal 
regulation itself. Sensitive issues include the quality, quantity and 
standardization of the information that is publicly disclosed, the 
use of poison pills by corporations with concentrated ownership, 
and the use of Brazilian Depositary Receipts by corporations with 
large operations in Brazil, among others.
131
  
Second, in developing countries it is not uncommon to find 
fairly modern legislation that does not work well in practice. To a 
large extent, this depressing note applies to Brazil. In particular, 
Brazilian courts are largely deemed by corporate lawyers and other 
market players to lack the necessary expertise to delve into the 
intricacies of securities laws and the economic dynamics of 
securities transactions. This trait can be partly attributed to the 
absence of courts and judges specialized in corporate and securities 
transactions. In fact, Brazilian courts are remarkably slow and their 
decisions on corporate matters are somewhat unpredictable.
132
 As 
so, the interpretation and doctrinal analysis of corporate law is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
her function or position. In 2002, CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002 objectively 
prohibited broader forms of insider trading. Accordingly, controlling 
shareholders, administrators, members of the audit committee, members of the 
board of directors, and members of any other statutory or advisory bodies to 
trade securities before the formal release by the corporation of notices required 
under the law in specific cases (“fatos relevantes”), or before the release of 
financial statements or of information on mergers and acquisitions involving the 
issuing corporation (art. 13). At the same time, the Capital Markets Law (Law 
No. 6,385 of 1976) was amended in order to criminalize the practice of insider 
trading (art. 27-D).  
130.  See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E 
INSIDER TRADING (1982); JOSÉ MARCELO MARTINS PROENÇA, INSIDER 
TRADING: REGIME JURÍDICO DO USO DE INFORMAÇÕES PRIVILEGIADAS NO 
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS (2005). 
131.  See generally, Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira & Sete Erros, Os 
Equívocos Cometidos pelas Companhias que Aproveitaram o Boom de IPOs 
CAPITAL ABERTO, Jul. 2009, at 62-63 (Part I) and Aug. 2009, at 58-59 (Part II). 
132.  See Luciana Gross Cunha et al, 2010, Relatório ICJBrasil, fourth 
quarter 2009, available at www.direitogv.com.br 
/subportais/RelICJBrasil4TRI2009.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011) (with a 
broad empirical research showing that the Brazilian Judiciary Power is 
perceived by the Brazilian population as relatively slow, partial, dishonest, and 
difficult to reach). 
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insufficient to reflect the reality of the standards of protection of 
minority shareholders. The most sophisticated debates within 
securities litigation take place in the course of administrative 
disputes at the CVM. To understand the big picture, however, one 
should also examine the actual enforcement of laws and 
regulations, both in court and at the administrative level by the 
CVM. This exercise is touched upon in the next section. 
 
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS 
 
Analyzing trends and identifying patterns in Brazilian case law 
is not an easy task.
133
 First, the country does not adhere to 
principles of stare decisis, and inconsistency in case law over 
corporate matters is legendary. Second, the country adopts a 
diffuse system of judicial review (meaning that any judge can 
declare a law unconstitutional), making it harder to identify the 
predominant judicial opinions.
134
 Finally, the degree to which 
judicial decisions are available for consultation over the internet 
varies depending on the topic and the state.  
This situation reinforces the usefulness of conducting statistical 
analysis to understand Brazilian case law. In a recent study, 
Viviane Muller Prado and Vinícius Buranelli analyzed a sample of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
133.  Luciana Luk-Tai Yeung & Paulo Furquim Azevedo, Beyond 
Conventional Wisdom and Anecdotal Evidence: Measuring Efficiency of 
Brazilian Courts, available at 
www.anpec.org.br/"encontro2009/inscricao.on/arquivos/000-
84cae2373a83e83852e80f24733f709e.pdf (arguing that “little effort has been 
made to objectively measure the efficiency in Brazilian courts. Studies that 
combine quantitative and qualitative analysis are even harder to find”). See also 
José Marcelo Maia Nogueira & Regina Silvia Pacheco. A Gestão do Poder 
Judiciário nos Estudos de Administração Pública, available at 
www.consad.org.br/sites/1500/1504/00000091.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011) 
134.  The Brazilian judicial review system is based on the coexistence of 
centralized and decentralized judicial review. It is partly inspired by the 
American model, in the sense that private parties bring constitutional issues 
before ordinary courts in regular judicial proceedings. At the same time, it is 
also possible to bring actions in relation to constitutional matters directly to the 
Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF). The Federal Supreme 
Court also has jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of statutes in 
abstracto. See, Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil. Nominal and Real, 3:1 
GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, art. 4 (2003) available at 
www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol3/iss1/art4 (last visited April 21, 2011); see 
also Joaquim Barbosa, Reflections on Brazilian Constitutionalism, 12 UCLA J. 
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 181 (2007). 
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50 cases and 92 appeals
135
 ruling on the protection of minority 
shareholders. This sample was comprised only of decisions given 
between 1998 and 2005 by the Superior Court of the State of São 
Paulo.
136
 This is the state where the BM&FBovespa is located, and 
also the state where most listed corporations have their 
headquarters. 
As illustrated in Table 1, most of the cases (66%) were brought 
to court by individuals, and institutional investors were the 
plaintiffs in only 18% of the cases. This finding contradicted the 
expectations of the researchers because the absence of class action 
mechanisms and problems of “rational ignorance”137 would 
suggest that the institutional investors—who have higher stakes 
and are more sophisticated than the individuals—would be the 
plaintiffs in most cases. The explanation could be that institutional 
investors have enough powers to engender political arrangements 
with the controlling groups that avoid the need of going to court, or 
perhaps it has to do with the nature of the issues being litigated. 
The corporations that issued the stocks were the defendants in 
most cases (88%). Controlling shareholders were the defendants in 
only 10% of the cases and the corporate officers in only 2%. In an 
environment where private benefits of control have historically 
been deemed to be high, the small amount of lawsuits against 
controlling shareholders may suggest that the regulations are lax 
on restricting controlling shareholders, and/or that proving a case 
against controlling shareholders is very difficult. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
135.  Different aspects of a case can be appealed many times, explaining 
why there are more appeals than cases in the sample. For methodological details 
on this research see Viviane Muller Prado & Vinícius Correa Buranelli, 
Relatório da Pesquisa de Jurisprudência sobre Direito Societário e Mercado de 
Capitais no Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, Cadernos Direito GV. Relatório 
de Pesquisa, no. 9, São Paulo, January 2006, available at 
www.direitogv.com.br/interna.aspx?PagId=HTKCNKWI&IDCategory=4&IDS
ubCategory=68 (last visited April 21, 2011). 
136.  Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo (TJSP). 
137.  Ignorance about an issue is said to be “rational” when the cost of 
educating oneself about the issue sufficiently to make an informed decision can 
outweigh any potential benefit one could reasonably expect to gain from that 
decision, and so it would be irrational to waste time doing so. 
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PLAINTIFFS PERCENTAGE 
Institutional investors 18 
Legal entities 14 
Individuals 66 
Public Prosecutor's Office 2 
Total 100 
 
DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE 
Corporation 88 
Controlling shareholder 10 
Officer 2 
Total 100 
 
The research also tried to identify the specific questions that 
were being litigated. As expected, the sample showed a larger 
proportion of lawsuits where shareholders tried to enforce their 
own direct interests and a lower proportion of lawsuits trying to 
hold officers or controlling shareholders liable.
138
 Common topics 
included the request for recognition of dissent and appraisal, 
request for higher dividends payments, and the request for the 
exhibition of corporation‟s documents, etc. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
138.  See supra notes 117-118.  
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* Legal disputes with shareholders who received stocks of telecom public 
utilities upon the purchase of new telephone lines in past decades. 
 
The CVM is in charge of supervising, investigating and 
punishing irregular acts that occur in the Brazilian capital market. 
In a recent study, Maria Cecília Rossi, Viviane Muller Prado and 
Alexandre Di Miceli have analyzed one hundred and one CVM 
decisions dealing with corporate law issues in the period between 
2000 and 2006.
139
 Approximately one in every four investors in the 
Brazilian market is an individual,
140
 which highlights the 
importance of the CVM because individual shareholders tend to be 
less sophisticated and less powerful than corporate shareholders. 
The CVM is in most cases responsible for initiating the 
investigations that eventually lead to an administrative proceedings 
seeking to punish some player in the capital market. In 61 of the 
cases (around 60% of the sample), the CVM became aware of 
some alleged wrongdoing by means of its own initiatives. Only in 
29 cases (29%) did the CVM initiate the investigation after it was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
139.  Maria Cecília Rossi et al., Decisões da CVM em Matéria Societária 
no Período de 2000 a 2006, 37 REVISTA DE DIREITO BANCÁRIO E DE MERCADO 
DE CAPITAIS 88-106 (2007). 
140.  NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INVESTORS HOME PAGE, 
http://www.ini.org.br/ini/site/informativo/Informativo_janeiro_ 2006 .pdf (last 
visited April 21, 2011). 
2011]   PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 183 
 
notified by minority shareholders, by investors in securities other 
than stocks, or by associations representing minority shareholders. 
Moreover, in four cases the CVM acted upon a notification by the 
Central Bank of Brazil, in three cases upon a notification of a 
member of an audit committee, and in one case the CVM acted 
upon a joint notification given by a member of the board of 
directors together with the corporation. In the remaining seven 
cases, the CVM acted because of other unrelated reasons. 
Officers, directors, controlling shareholders were the main 
targets of the CVM‟s administrative processes. Here there is a 
sharp distinction with the judicial proceedings, in which the 
corporation itself was most often the defendant. The CVM filed 80 
proceedings against officers, 66 against directors, 40 against the 
controlling shareholders, 11 against auditors, and 27 proceedings 
were filed against members that are not in any of these categories. 
The length of time between the date of the infraction and the 
conclusion of the administrative proceeding lasted on average six 
years. In spite of some investments that had been made by the 
government to strengthen the CVM, the study could not identify 
any trend demonstrating a decrease in the duration of the 
proceedings. 
Alleged infractions to disclosure requirements, abuse of 
controlling powers and wrongdoings by officers were the themes 
that appeared most frequently in the administrative proceedings. 
The high number of disclosure issues being litigated can be 
partially explained by the fact that these kinds of infraction are the 
easiest detected by the CVM, yet that does not mean that 
disclosure problems are the most relevant ones. Moreover, the 
degree of acquittal of the individuals being prosecuted for 
disclosure mistakes is rather high. 
Table 2 below shows that the proportion of convictions over 
time had increased for certain groups and decreased for others. 
This is due to a change in the pattern of issuances of subpoenas by 
the CVM, because in recent times the CVM has been adopting a 
strategy of issuing subpoenas to a large number of individuals who 
may be potentially involved in wrongdoing, even if there is not 
clear evidence against any one of them individually sufficient to 
initiate a proceeding. 
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*Updated as of June 2006. 
 
The main reasons for acquittal of the defendants were the 
inapplicability of the specific legal provision to the conduct that 
gave rise to the investigation, the absence of responsibility of the 
defendant for the specific conduct being prosecuted, and the 
absence of sufficient evidence. The cases of insider trading 
presented higher levels of acquittals, and this is probably due to the 
fact that they are harder to prove. In the cases where there was a 
conviction, the penalties most commonly applied were fines. 
The relatively low levels of enforcement of the law and the 
legal uncertainties prevailing in Brazil with respect to corporate 
matters have contributed to the expansion of alternative dispute 
resolution methods, particularly through arbitration proceedings. 
Historically, Brazilian courts have been refractory to arbitration. 
Because of this, the 2001 amendment to the Corporations Law has 
expressly permitted the corporation‟s bylaws to specify arbitration 
as a means to resolve disputes involving shareholders. Moreover, 
BM&FBovespa has made the use of arbitration mandatory for 
corporations listed in the Novo Mercado and Level 2. 
While the study found no statistical evidence on effectiveness 
and frequency of arbitration proceedings, anecdotal evidence 
shows that the use of arbitration in corporate matters involving 
Conviction 
Conviction + acquittal 
Acquittal of all 
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minority shareholders remains problematic.
141
 The election to use 
arbitration does not preclude the parties from requesting 
precautionary injunctions in court. Such precautionary injunctions 
can be appealed, often leading to time consuming court battles that 
can paralyze arbitration proceedings for a long time. Further and 
more importantly, court enforcement of arbitration awards can 
itself lead to lengthy court proceedings. This is particularly 
problematic because it is not uncommon to find cases where judges 
reopen the merits of the arbiter‟s decision. All of that suggest that 
the improvement of Brazilian courts should remain an important 
concern for investors, lawyers and policymakers in the years to 
come. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The protection of minority shareholders in Brazilian listed 
corporations is subject to a dual legal framework. The relative 
laxity of the Corporations Law lies in direct contrast with the much 
greater stringency of the rules established by BM&FBovespa for 
stocks traded in its Novo Mercado. In any case, the effectiveness 
of either framework is hampered by procedural problems both at 
the judicial and administrative levels. However, the existence of 
these problems should not obscure the fact that corporate 
governance practices have dramatically improved in Brazil over 
the past decade. BM&FBovespa would probably not have 
advanced so dramatically had it not been for a major change in the 
attitude toward corporate governance. A static approach leaves 
some questions as to the quality of the legal protection currently 
available to minority shareholders. Yet, examining a more 
dynamic, or historical approach, suggests a promising trend. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
141.  See Adriana Braghetta et al, Arbitragem e Poder Judiciário: Uma 
Radiografia dos Casos de Arbitragem que Chegam ao Judiciário Brasileiro, 6:6 
CADERNOS DIREITO GV (Nov. 2009) (generally surveying arbitration 
proceedings in Brazil).  
  
 
